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The European Union is gradually opening up its domestic letter markets 
for competition. Complete liberalization is planned for 2009. In contrast to 
the European developments, the United States developed worksharing as a 
means to introduce competition in the postal sector. However, despite the 
examples of the EU and the U.S., in most countries letter services are still 
national monopolies. 
In  Switzerland,  the  universal  service  provider  (USP)  is  Swiss  Post, 
which currently enjoys a monopoly on addressed letters up to a weight of 1 
kilogram. The Swiss government has the power to open up the letter market 
if  the  provision  of  the  universal  service  obligation  (USO)  remains 
guaranteed. Hence, prior to any further market opening, it is crucial to know 
how competition affects the financial viability of Swiss Post with or without 
a  licensing  system.  Such  a  licensing  system  has  been  introduced  in  the 
recently  liberalized  parcels  market.  The  regulatory  authority  PostReg  is 
entitled  to  collect  licensing  fees  that  amount  up  to  3%  on  an  entrant‟s 
turnover  to  compensate  Swiss  Post  for  its  universal  service  provision  if 
needed.  
Our paper provides insights on the consequences of different kinds of 
liberalization or regulatory rules of the Swiss letter market.  We examine 
welfare effects and financial consequences for both Swiss Post and potential 
market  entrants.  We  start  with  an  analysis  of  what  would  happen  if  the 
current regulation of the parcels market were applied to the letter market. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop and tailor a 
game theoretic model to the Swiss postal system. In Section 3, we calibrate 
the  model  with  Swiss  data.  Section  4  presents  our  results  on  end-to-end 
competition  and  compares  them  with  an  evaluation  of  the  regulated 
monopoly of 2003. We show that end-to-end competition results in lower 
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welfare  and  problems  to  finance  the  USO  even  if  a  licensing  system  is 
introduced. Building on these results, we expand the model in Section 5 and 
analyze  alternative  regulatory  scenarios.  We  show  that  worksharing  will 
increase economic welfare. The last section contains a discussion and our 
main conclusions.  
 
2. BASIC MODEL AND FORMAL RESULTS  
In order to analyze the effects of liberalization in the Swiss letter market, 
we use a standard game theoretic approach. On the supply side, we let Swiss 
Post as incumbent I compete with a representative entrant E. The demand 
side links the two operators. Customers value the available products with 
respect to quality and prices. Strategic interaction takes place, where one 
operator‟s behavior affects both operators‟ profits. For example, when the 
incumbent raises its prices, some consumers will switch to the entrant and 
boost the entrant‟s sales.  
Technically  speaking  we  use  a  Dixit-like  approach  to  model  price 
competition  with  product  differentiation  and  assume  that  there  are  no 
information asymmetries. 
2.1. Basic Model 
On the demand side, we assume a representative sender with quasilinear 
preferences with respect to money
2. The quasilinearity implies a cardinal 
utility measure that enables us to compute and compare  overall welfare of 
different market structures. To obtain linear demand curves, we assume  a 
quadratic utility function over every quantity of mail qi
rs sent in segment s of 
region r through the network of operator i. Formally, we follow De Donder 
et al. (2001) and write total utility U as  
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2 Having in mind that most senders are businesses, quasilinearity is a reasonable 
assumption in the modeled riskless world. Businesses invest into mail as long as 
the NPV of an additional mailing is nonnegative, i.e. marginal utility of mail is 
greater than or equal to 1. Further, in an economy like Switzerland where postal 
consumption is small compared to total expenditure, postal consumption will be 
independent of the initial wealth endowment Y. Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 3 
 
 
where a, b, e > 0 and m is the amount of money spent on other goods. The 
last term reflects the fact that the mail services offered by the two operators 
are not perfect substitutes but rather differentiated products. The higher the 
degree of differentiation, the closer to zero is parameter e. Parameters a and 
b determine the market size and the slope of the demand curve. 
A consequence of this utility specification is that demand in one market 
does  not  affect  demand  in  another  one.  That  is,  cross-price  elasticities 
between the market segments are zero and operators cannot increase demand 
in one market segment by serving an additional segment, i.e. no network 
externalities are directly included.  
Utility maximization implies that our representative consumer satisfies 




rs)+ m  Y, where pi
rs 
is the price the consumer has to pay to operator i for the mail product s 
delivered  to  region  r.  Y  represents  the  initial  wealth  endowment  of  the 
economy. By computing the first-order conditions of the Lagrange function 
and solving the resulting equation system, we obtain the demand functions 
for the incumbent and the competitor as 
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The  slope  of the demand curve in a given market is  equal  for both 
operators. Quantities are negatively related to the own price and positively to 
the price of the competitor (qi/pi < 0; qi/pj > 0). Furthermore, quantities 
increase with a higher degree of product differentiation (i.e., a smaller e).   
On the supply side, pricing possibilities and cost structures determine 
profit  functions.  In  the  case  of  unregulated  competition,  where  the 
incumbent  and  the  entrant  face  no  regulatory  restrictions  on  pricing  and 
production decisions, the operators are able to differentiate prices for every 
market segment and hence take into account demand properties specified in 
(1). We  assume  that  there  are  no economies  of  scope  between  products, 
segments  or  regions.  This  assumption  allows  us  to  treat  the  production 
decision in each market segment independently. 
Total costs per segment consist of a fixed and variable part. Entry occurs 
if entrant E‟s earnings exceed variable costs cq and fixed costs F. In contrast, 
the  incumbent‟s  fixed  costs  are  sunk  and  cannot  be  avoided.  The 
introduction of fixed costs is equivalent to increasing economies of scale, so 
the  market  has  the  property  of  a  natural  monopoly  especially  in  those 
segments where fixed costs are high.  
2.2. Regulated Competition with Swiss Licensing System 
So  far,  there  was  no  political  or  regulatory  authority  captured  in  the 
model.  When  such  authorities  set  market  rules,  they  usually  change  the Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 4 
 
 
underlying  cost  structures  of  the  various  operators.  In  Switzerland,  the 
incumbent Swiss Post must provide universal service. This USO contains 
uniform  tariffs  across  regions  and  service  provision  in  every  market 
segment. Additionally, the mail section of Swiss Post has to pay a transfer T 
to cover the deficit in the postal offices. If the incumbent does not break 
even due to cherry-picking entrants, the regulatory authority is entitled to 
charge licensing fees. Such fees are collected as a fixed fraction  of the 
entrant‟s turnover. We treat   as an exogenous parameter. Under such a 
regulatory regime, the profit functions in a given market segment are 
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Profit  maximization  yields  s(r+1)  first-order  conditions  (FOC). 
Substituting the demand functions (1) into these first-order conditions, we 
obtain  the  reaction  functions  for  the  two  operators.  For  the  case  of  two 
regions D (dense) and R (rural), the two reaction functions in a given market 
segment s are 
 
   
     . , ) (
,
) ( 2
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) , (
1 2
1 R D r ep ea a p p
b b

































E     





  (3) 
 
The incumbent‟s reaction function is much more complicated because it 
must average its price over the two regions. By solving this equation system, 
we obtain the equilibrium prices for each operator given that entry occurs, 
(i.e. the entrant‟s revenues exceed variable and fixed costs): 
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Once this price   is calculated,  we obtain  the price of the entrant by 
appropriately  substituting this result into (3 ).  If the entry condition is 
satisfied, the corresponding quantities can be calculated with the demand 
functions in (1).  
If  entry is not profitable  at  the  incumbent‟s  price  in  (4),  the  above 
formulae no longer hold. For example, if the entrant fails to break even in 
the dense area, the incumbent can improve its profits by increasing the price Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 5 
 
 
up to the limit at which the entrant just breaks even
3. This „opponent break 
even  price‟  is  limited  by  the  monopoly  price  p
M.  However,  because  of 
uniform pricing, any increase in the incumbent‟s price affects both regions 
and it is not clear how to balance the two different „opponent break even 
prices‟  in  every  situation.  In  our  simulation,  we  solve  this  problem 
numerically  through  appropriate  use  of  the  entrant‟s  reaction  and  profit 
functions. With the resulting equilibrium prices, quantities and profits we 
can compute overall welfare by subtracting industry expenses from gross 
utility.  Doing  so  is  equivalent  to  summing  consumer  net  utility  and  the 
operators‟ profits. 
2.3. Licensing fees lead to higher prices 
Expressions (3) and (4) yield a first interesting result. Because the first 
derivative with respect to the licensing rate  is positive under reasonable 
calibration, the incumbent will increase prices the more the regulator tries to 
finance the incumbent‟s USO through the licensing system. Intuitively, one 
would expect exactly the opposite. To see the intuition behind this result, we 
first study the impact of an increase in  on the price of the entrant. To offset 
the negative effect of higher unit costs, the entrant must respond with an 
increase in prices; a higher licensing fee reduces the competitiveness of the 
entrant in equilibrium. Now the incumbent can charge a slightly higher price 
without losing any volume and thus further increases profits.  
The financial effects to the incumbent can be identified by analyzing the 
marginal effect of  on its profit function:  
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The first term is the direct effect and represents the positive impact of the 
collected licensing fees. This direct effect equals pEqE and is positive. The 
second and third terms represent indirect effects arising from price responses 
of both operators. The second term is zero at the optimum (because of the 
FOC). The third term is positive because both parts are positive (prices are 
strategic complements and both optimal prices increase with the license fee). 
We  can  therefore  conclude  that  the  incumbent‟s  profits  increase  with  a 
higher licensing fee. Thus, the licensing fee will help to sustain the USO, but 
will lead to a higher overall price level. 
 
                                                 
3 This limit price p
Limit could be calculated as follows: 
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3. CALIBRATION WITH SWISS DATA 
In order to predict price and welfare effects more precisely, we simulate 
the model using Swiss data. In Switzerland, geographic characteristics have 
a major impact on the cost structure of services. Differences in delivery time 
per  household  between  dense  and  rural  areas  are  significant  and  vary 
between delivery offices as much as 1:6. Accordingly, we divide the market 
into a dense region D and a rural region R.  
To reflect the market structure we segment the market into five basic 
market  segments  s.  The  two  basic  sender  groups,  “businesses”  and 
“households,”  can  choose  between  two  products  “slow  mail”  and  “fast 
mail.” In addition, businesses have the option of mass mail. Crossing regions 
and segments yields ten submarkets.  
To  estimate  the  demand  functions  (1)  for  each  operator  in  each 
submarket, we must calibrate the parameters a and b with market data from 
2003, when Swiss Post was still the only operator in the letter market and 
charged  regulated  prices.  Rewriting  (1)  for  the  case  of  this  regulated 
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After rearranging (5), we can directly calibrate parameter b with prices, 
quantities and elasticities from 2003.  
Parameter  ai  influences  the  size  of  the  market  of  the  two  operator‟s 
services. By setting aI > aE, we can include effects like customer inertia, 
reputation effects, switching costs, or even quality differences like universal 
service provision that work in favor of the USP. Formally, we define x as the 
percentage of total demand the incumbent receives if the entrant were to 
offer the same price for its services. In the remainder of the paper, we will 
refer to x as “incumbent advantage.” For calibration we evaluate demand 
given in (1) at 2003 prices for both operators and solve the resulting equation 
system. We obtain 
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Table  1  summarizes  the  major  demand  characteristics  of  the  model. 
According to its 2003 annual report, Swiss Post delivered about 2.8 billion 
pieces of addressed mail, of which we assume 25% was destined to rural 
areas. The price elasticities are a delicate issue for two reasons. First, there is Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 7 
 
 
considerable divergence of opinion on the level. See Cazals (2002) for an 
overview and discussion. Second, price elasticities determine the steepness 
of the demand  curves; competition is  more effective  and  leads  to  higher 
welfare  results  if  price  elasticities  are  greater,  ceteris  paribus.  The  most 
recent  data  of  Swiss  Post  2004  suggests  that  the  values  in  Table  1  are 
overestimated.  These  reflect  our  assumptions  based  on  estimations  from 
former  Swiss  data,  studies  from  other  countries,  and  industry  experts. 
However, we expect mail elasticity to grow over time due to an increase of 
substitutes. Therefore, we stay on the safe side with the overestimation. The 
main intuition behind the differences between segments is a substantially 
higher  value  per  sent  item  for  households  (so  businesses  are  more  price 
sensitive), and an increasing variety of urgent communication possibilities 
such as e-mail resulting in a higher elasticity of fast mail compared to slow 
mail
4.  
The incumbent advantage x is assumed to be higher for households than 
for businesses because of higher relative switching and information costs. 
The  experiences  from  other  liberalized  postal,  telecommunications  or 
electricity markets support our assumptions; recent examples in Switzerland 
include Swiss Post in the parcels market. 
 
Table 1: Major Demand Characteristics 
  Market size 
2003 
Prices 2003  
(in €) 
Price elasticity  Incumbent 
advantage 
Fast Mail B   21 %  0.56  -0.5  70 % 
Fast Mail HH  6 %  0.60  -0.4  75 % 
Slow Mail B  26 %  0.43  -0.4  65 % 
Slow Mail HH  6 %  0.47  -0.3  70 % 
Mass Mail B  39 %  0.33  -0.4  60 % 
 
For the production side of the economy we estimate variable and fixed 
costs  for  collection,  processing,  delivery  and  overhead.  This  detailed 
attribution is somewhat artificial, as some economies of scale and scope get 
lost.  Such  effects  could  be  included  numerically,  but  then  we  could  not 
compute unique equilibrium formulae anymore. 
Table 2 shows how costs differ in the various market segments. In a first 
step, we map total costs based on data from Swiss Post‟s 2003 annual report 
onto processes. Thereby we first corrected total cost by subtracting the € 234 
million  contribution  that  the  addressed  letter  products  paid  last  year  to 
finance  the  postal  outlet  network‟s  deficit.  In  line  with  empirical  and 
technical estimations from comparable countries in Europe, Table 2 shows 
that delivery accounts for the largest portion of total costs.  
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In a second step, we attribute these process costs to market segments and 
regions. The figures are estimates and cannot reflect the economies of scope 
between  the  various  segments  and  processes.  Implicitly,  we  assume  that 
collection costs are much higher for households and slightly higher for fast 
mail  segments.  Processing  is  slightly  more  expensive  for  fast  mail  but 
cheaper for mass mail because of extended presorting possibilities. Delivery 
costs are mainly determined by the quantity per segment and are slightly 
more expensive for fast mail and household segments. Overhead spreads 
equally over all segments.  
For  the  implemented  scale  effects,  the  fraction  of  fixed  costs  is 
important.  In  Switzerland,  the  number  of  letters  per  capita  is  the  second 
largest in the world. Hence, the total time the mail carriers need to reach the 
various delivery points is almost fixed and the economies of scale in delivery 
are  large.  In  accordance  with  most  of  the  literature,  we  assume  that 
processing  costs  are  much  more  elastic.  In  total,  about  50%  of  the 
incumbent‟s  total  costs  are  fixed.  Compared  to  the  incumbent,  whose 
infrastructure is historically grown, designed for private customers and more 
capital  intensive  (postal  outlets,  sorting  centers,  delivery  offices),  the 
entrant‟s percentage of variable costs is higher. 
 
Table 2: Major cost characteristics 
  Collection  Processing  Delivery  Overhead 
  10 %  30 %  55 %  5 % 
Cost attribution to market segments 
Fast Mail B   15 %  20 %  24 %  20 % 
Fast Mail HH  38 %  17 %  8 %  20 % 
Slow Mail B  10 %  18 %  26 %  20 % 
Slow Mail HH  30 %  16 %  6 %  20 % 
Mass Mail B  7 %  29 %  36 %  20 % 
  100 %  100 %  100 %  100 % 
Fraction of variable costs 
Incumbent  50 %  80 %  40 %  10 % 
Entrant  75 %  85 %  50 %  50 % 
 
So far, the main difference between the two operators was the entrant‟s 
lower fraction of fixed costs. According to current observations in the Swiss 
parcel market, competitors pay lower wages. As stated by the labor unions, 
the wage premium is currently around 16% and hits the incumbent especially 
hard because about 80% of total costs are labor costs. The network design 
tailored to business customers further reduces the entrant‟s cost. We assume 
the upstream efficiency advantage (collection and presorting) of about 30% 
to reflect the savings realized by computerized sorting in the printing stage. 
In delivery, this advantage is much smaller (5%). Most business mailings are 
business-to-consumer. Consequently, one large customer causes a great deal 
of  delivery  points.  Hence,  a  delivery  network  similar  to  that  of  the Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 9 
 
 
incumbent  is  needed  with  limited  ways  of  cost  innovation  (the  work  is 
mainly physical). 
 
4. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
With the calibrated model, we are now able to give some insight into the 
overall welfare consequences of various regulatory frameworks. In addition, 
we can perform sensitivity analysis and derive recommendations for postal 
operators on the strategies they should pursue under specific market rules. 
We focus on the first question and carry out sensitivity analysis only to judge 
the  robustness  of  the  results.  In  a  first  step,  we  evaluate  the  regulated 
monopoly of Swiss Post of 2003. Next, we analyze different forms of end-
to-end competition (complete liberalization without access possibilities) and 
change  the  introduced  model  slightly  where  needed.  The  monopoly 
scenarios serve primarily as a benchmark. 
The  quantitative  results  presented  in  this  section  serve  as  rough 
guidelines in which directions the examined regulatory regimes influence the 
market equilibrium in terms of prices, quantities, surpluses, and profits. 
4.1. Monopoly: Positive effects of a price freeze 
It is straightforward to evaluate the regulated monopoly (RM) of 2003, 
since  the  model  was  calibrated  with  data  of  2003.  Swiss  post  charged 
uniform prices at an average of 44 cents. With the underlying cost structure, 
the resulting loss was € 54 million, thus Swiss Post was close to break even 
despite of the USO. From now on, we will use this scenario as a benchmark 
reflecting the status quo
5. 
As  a  second  benchmark,  we  examine  the  case  of  an  unregulated 
monopoly  (UM).  What  would  happen,  if  the  incumbent  charged  profit 
maximizing  uniform  prices?  The  results  are  interesting.  The  monopolist 
almost doubles its prices to 82 cents on average and thereby boosts its profit 
up to € 349 million. Profits are positive in all market segments except fast 
mail for households in rural areas. However, the higher price level reduces 
consumer  welfare  dramatically:  despite  the  high  profit,  a  net  welfare 
decrease of € -497 million results. Table 3 presents the details. 
We conclude that Swiss Post did not charge monopoly prices in 2003
6. 
For that reason, one could view the legal framework of 2003 as an effective 
price cap combined with a  break-even constraint. However, one does not 
know whether the regulated monopolist produced efficient.  
 
                                                 
5 At this point, we note that there was a price increase in Switzerland in the 
beginning of 2004 due to the deficit in the postal network. 
6 Only if elasticities were assumed to be 3.5 times larger than the values in table 1, 
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Table 3: Results monopoly cases 
Legal Monopoly  Regulated   Unregulated  
Average Price   0.44    0.82  
Quantities (in Mio)   2836    1'787  
Consumer Surplus  1491  591 
Profit after transfer   -54    349  
Welfare   1'437    940  
Welfare change     -497  
4.2. End-to-end Competition: Universal service at risk 
In theory, competition leads to positive welfare effects mainly due to 
marginal  cost  pricing,  improved  efficiency,  and  product  innovation.  To 
reflect these potential benefits, we equipped the entrant with a substantial 
efficiency  advantage.  Additionally,  we  assume  that  the  entrant  improves 
product diversification, technically we set e = 0.75
7. However, it is not clear 
for two main reasons, whether these positive effects lead to  an increase in 
overall welfare.  First, positive economies of  scale  diminish  when entry 
occurs, so the market ends up with larger industry wide production costs . 
Second,  the combination of a relatively inelastic demand with product 
differentiation possibilities could lead to oligopolistic pricing rather than 
marginal cost pricing. It will be interesting to see whether the model predicts 
prices above or below the ones from 2003.  
In our first end-to-end competition case, hereafter referred to “Regulated 
Competition (RC)”, there are no restrictions on market entry. The incumbent 
must fulfill the universal service  obligation as presented in Section 2. In 
return, the entrant must pay a licensing fee of 3% of its turnover. 
The model predicts an overall welfare decrease with universal service at 
risk. Despite an 18% increase in the overall price level, the incumbent‟s loss 
rises  to  about  €  189  million.  Entry  occurs  in  all  three  dense  business 
segments. Both operators make substantial profits with single-piece business 
mail.  The  incumbent  reaches  its best  margins  in rural business  segments 
where  no  economies  of  scale  are  lost.  The  main  losses  occur  in  the 
household  segments.  The  results  are  straightforward  and  support  similar 
findings  from  Panzar (2001,  2002),  Crew/Kleindorfer  (2002),  De  Donder 
(2004) and Dietl/Waller (2002).  
The incumbent‟s main problem arises from the combination of universal 
service provision and uniform pricing. The entrant is able to undercut the 
incumbent in the dense segments and “picks the cherries,” offered by the 
incumbent‟s tariff balancing act between the dense and rural region. This 
cherry-picking  effect  is  much  stronger  than  the  cure  for  it,  the  licensing 
system. The entrant has to pay no more than € 15 million in licensing fees, a 
sum that represents less than 10% of its profits (and the incumbent‟s loss).  
                                                 
7 in line with De Donder (2001) and Dietl/Waller (2002) Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 11 
 
 
We  observe  a  lot  of  price  differentiation  between  the  various  market 
segments. Prices for households rise about 50%, whereas the average price 
in business segments rises about 10%, despite the entrant‟s cheaper prices.  
 
Table 4: Results End-to-End Competition 
  Regulated  (uniform pricing for I)  Unregulated (non uniform pricing) 
Licensing Rate   = 0%   = 3%   = 20%   = 0%   = 3%   = 20% 
Average Price (€)             
Incumbent   0.56    0.57    0.48    0.43    0.45    0.50  
Entrant*   0.39    0.39    0.43    0.38    0.39      
Average   0.49    0.50    0.48    0.43    0.44    0.50  
Quantities (Mio #)             
Incumbent   1'652    1'631    2'408    2'540    2'503    2'571  
Entrant   1'176    1'177    350    322    323    -    
Total   2'828    2'808    2'759    2'863    2'826    2'571  
Welfare (Mio €)             
Consumer Surplus  1'351  1'331  1'356  1'481  1'444  1'246 
Profit I after transfer   -217    -196    -27    -124    -97    82  
Profit Entrant   168    159    36    41    39    -    
Welfare   1'302    1'294    1'365    1'398    1'386    1'328  
Welfare change**   -135    -143    -72    -39    -51    -109  
Other              
Licensing Fees (€)   -      14    30    -      4    -    
Entry in # segments   3    3    1    1    1    -    
*   The values in this row represent weighted averages in active market segments. 
** Values compared to the regulated monopoly case 
 
One promising strategy for the USP against this kind of cherry picking is 
to abolish the uniform price. In such an Unregulated Competition (UC) the 
incumbent can differentiate its prices between regions. To implement this 
regulatory  framework  into  the  model,  we  make  appropriate  changes  to 
expressions (2), (3) and (4). Doing so results in major change. The USP can 
now prevent entry in all segments except slow mail business. In the three 
market segments in which  the entrant  cannot enter anymore, we observe 
predatory behavior. The incumbent sets prices below the optimal prices in 
(4) to turn the entrant‟s profit into a deficit; the entrant cannot break even 
anymore  and  no  entry  occurs.  The  incumbent  is  better  off  because  he 
defends 100% of the market. From this combination of predatory pricing and 
price discrimination between regions, consumers gain a € 100 million net 
surplus;  the  incumbent‟s  prices  are  much  lower  on  average,  e.g.  mass 
mailers gain about € 70 million net surplus (on the cost of rural regions). 
Nevertheless, there are  also  losers,  namely  the entrant  and  the  less price 
elastic households in rural areas where tariffs explode by more than 100%.  
Compared to the regulated competition, the model predicts an overall 
welfare  gain  of  €  92  million  and  a  better  financial  situation  for  the 
incumbent.  Still,  the  results  are  worse  than  in  the  case  of  the  regulated 
monopoly  of  2003.  However,  the  welfare  effects  of  this  unregulated Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 12 
 
 
competition  may  be  overestimated.  There  are  several  justifications  for 
uniform pricing the model does not include. Examples are political reasons, 
menu  and  transaction  costs,  network  externalities,  and  unwanted 
redistribution from rural regions and households to businesses, etc. We leave 
these extensions for further research. Table 4 summarizes the results.  
4.3. Ambiguous effects of the licensing rate  
For the above results, we assumed a licensing rate of 3%. If no licensing 
fee were collected  ( = 0%), the results  would change only  slightly. As 
predicted in section 2.3, both operators offer lower prices. Consequently, the 
incumbent‟s loss rises by an additional € 21 million, which is more than the 
foregone  licensing  fees  (€  14  million).  Thus,  the  indirect  effect  of  the 
licensing system is in this case € 7 million (caused by price changes). The 
lower rate increases the entrant‟s potential profit margin, weakens the entry 
barrier function of the licensing system and leads to higher losses for the 
incumbent.  
If the licensing rate is set to 20%, we observe a further important aspect 
of the licensing system. In the case of RC, we observe now only one market 
entry instead of three. The licensing system turns into a barrier to entry. In 
this special case, the entry barrier is desirable because the threat of entry 
forces  the  incumbent  to  charge  low  prices.  As  a  result,  overall  welfare 
increases and the incumbent almost beaks even due to the indirect effect 
worth  €  156  million  (direct  effect  =  additional  16  million).  These  good 
results are only one side of the coin, as we can see for the case of UC, where 
the incumbent‟s prices rise and welfare decreases. If the licensing rate is too 
high, the threat of entry is too low and the incumbent improves profits at the 
cost of overall welfare. 
Graph 1 gives further insight into the mechanism of the licensing system. 
Under Regulated Competition, the incumbent breaks even with a licensing 
rate of 23%. Welfare is maximized at 26%. This is the point at which the 
entrant  has  to  give  up  service  even  in  the  last  segment  (slow  mail 
businesses). Still the threat of entry persists and sets the upper bound for the 
incumbent‟s prices. Any further rate increase would decrease the threat of 
entry and the incumbent (now a monopolist) can adjust his prices towards 
the profit maximizing unregulated monopoly solution.  
In the case of Unconstrained Competition, the optimal licensing rate is 
0% where entry occurs in only one market segment. Up to a rate of 10%, the 
entrant stays in. At 10%, the incumbent is able to push the entrant out of the 
market by profitable predatory pricing. This discrete drop in prices yields the 
welfare jump that can be seen in the graph. From now on, any increase of the 
licensing rate reduces welfare. 
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Graph 1: Impact of the licensing rate on welfare and profits 
 
4.4. Comparison of the four regulatory regimes and first conclusions 
Having  calculated  overall  price  levels  as  well  as  the  welfare  of  the 
different market rules, we are now able to make normative statements about 
which of the four scenarios a welfare-maximizing regulator should prefer. 
None of the competitive scenarios described above could reach the welfare 
of the Regulated Monopoly of 2003, even if a regulator maximized welfare 
with an optimal licensing rate. The model gives the following ordering in 
terms of welfare
8:  UM UC RC RM    % 0 * % 26 *     .  
If  we  apply  these  results  to  Switzerland,  neither  of  the  dis cussed 
competition  scenarios  is  efficient.  End-to-end  competition  does  not 
necessarily lead to lower prices   because of strategic interaction and the 
natural monopoly in delivery. Welfare is likely to decrease, and Swiss Post‟s 
ability  to  fund  its  universal  service  obligation  is  heavily  reduced.  These 
conclusions include positive effects of competition, such as higher product 
choice and a highly more efficient entrant.  
In  a  dynamic  context,  Regulated  “Competition”  with  a  licensing  rate 
between  20%  and  25%  might  still  be  best  because  a  profit-maximizing 
incumbent has direct incentives to reduce costs further. Suppose a regime in 
which the regulator reduces the licensing rate yearly by 1% for ten years. If 
the incumbent is able to reduce his costs appropriately, it can lower prices 
further to prevent a competitor‟s entry and thereby secure a 100% market 
                                                 
8 Only if elasticities are assumed at least 50% higher than the ones in Table 1, both 
competition scenarios turn out to be better than RM. As pointed out in section 3, 
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share for exploiting the scale effects in distribution. From this point of view, 
a regulatory system similar to the one in Finland is reasonable.     
4.5. Other ways for competition 
There  are  various  other  ways  to  introduce  competition  in  the  letter 
market.  One  could  relax  universal  service  restrictions  further,  find  other 
mechanisms  for  financing  the  USO  (taxes,  fixed  licensing  rates,  etc), 
introduce  various  forms  of  access  regimes,  copy  U.S.  Worksharing,  or 
combine the discussed competition designs with price cap regulation.  
Combining  end-to-end  competition  with  some  form  of  downstream 
access,  where  entrants  can  hand  over  mail  to  the  incumbent‟s  delivery 
network  if  wanted,  will  provide  entrants  with  additional  possibilities  of 
cherry  picking  by  focusing  on  processes  (in  addition  to  customers  and 
regions).  Crew/Kleindorfer  (2004),  De  Donder  (2004)  and  Panzar  (2003) 
show that these “bypass possibilities” will have negative effects on welfare 
and USO provision. We let the Swiss access issue for further research and 
focus directly on worksharing as a means to introduce competition in the 
letter market.  
  
5. WORKSHARING AND PRICE CAP COMPETITION 
Worksharing  aims  to  minimize  the  costs  of  industry-wide  service 
provision  in  the  U.S.  letter  market.  The  incumbent  United  States  Postal 
Service  (USPS)  is  granted  a  monopoly  in  delivery  (“downstream 
monopoly”),  whereas  competitors  can  perform  upstream  services  like 
collection and presorting just as well. For these upstream services, USPS 
gives “worksharing discounts” on the official retail prices, depending on the 
value of the competitor‟s services for USPS. The system makes sense in 
economic terms if delivery has the property of a natural monopoly and its 
innovation potential is limited in contrast to upstream services. Worksharing 
evolved over the last 30 years. Today, about 70% of total U.S. mail volume 
is workshared and the sum of all worksharing discounts is about US$ 14.  
5.1. Modeling Worksharing 
To  compare  Worksharing  (WS)  with  the  regulatory  frameworks 
discussed above, some small changes of the model are needed. We change 
the demand side only to the extent that two calibration values are slightly 
changed. First, we reduce the incumbent advantage x in all segments by 50% 
(i.e.  xnew  =  ½xold  +  ¼)  because  the  entrant  takes  some  advantage  of  the 
incumbent‟s  downstream  reputation  and  quality.  Customers  will  switch 
faster to the entrant. Second, product differentiation possibilities are smaller 
because  the  entrant  cannot  deliver  anymore.  Therefore,  we  assume  the Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 15 
 
 
product  differentiation  factor  e  to  rise  to  0.85.  In  other  words,  the  two 
services of the two operators are still considered as two different products 
and demand is still described by (1). 
The major changes are on the cost side, as the entrant is legally obliged 
to buy the downstream services from the incumbent. In return, the entrant 
receives a discount of δ
s (the “worksharing discount”) for his collection and 
presorting efforts in market segment s
9. In other words, the entrant pays the 
access price A = pI - δ to the incumbent for final processing and delivery. 
The entrant‟s variable costs for its upstream activities are cEu, whereas the 
incumbent‟s variable costs split up in an upstream and downstream part, i.e.  
cI = cIu + cId. 
Since  the  universal  service  obligation  can  now  be  financed  by  the 
downstream monopoly, there is no reason for a licensing fee anymore, i.e. 
μ=0.  We  thus  rewrite  the  profit  functions  (2)  as  follows  (for  any  given 
market segment):  
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5.2. U.S. Worksharing 
In the U.S., both retail prices and worksharing discounts are regulated.  
The Postal Rate Commission (PRC) is entitled to give its recommendations 
about  pricing  issues  raised  by  the  USPS.  Worksharing  discounts  are 
calculated using ECPR, where discounts equal USPS‟ cost savings for the 
respective worksharing activity (“avoided costs”).  
In the model, the incumbent‟s savings are exactly the upstream variable 
costs cIu. We rewrite (6) accordingly and set cIu = δ for the worksharing 
discount  and  pI  =  p2003  for  the  retail  prices  (i.e.  again  a  price  freeze  to 
compare  with  the  other  price  freeze  scenarios).  To  obtain  the  profit-
maximizing price for the entrant, we compute its first order condition. In 
equilibrium, optimal prices are 
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9 I.e. the modeled worksharing system is very stylized. In the U.S., there are various 
classes of worksharing discounts, and private operators need not to do all the 
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The  results  are  straightforward.  If  entry  occurs,  there  is  a  Pareto 
improvement  compared  to  the  Regulated  Monopoly.  The  incumbent  is 
indifferent  whether  to  workshare  or  not  and  is  better  off  if  the  entrant 
generates additional volume. Consumers only buy the products of the entrant 
if they gain net utility. The entrant can only enter if it charges lower prices 
due  to  more  efficient  production  and/or  it  generates  additional  demand 
through  product  differentiation.  In  both  cases,  volumes  increase  when 
demand is downward sloping as assumed. Empirical findings from Cohen et 
al. (2002) support this argument.   
In line with the theory, the model predicts an increase in overall volume 
of  2.2%.  In  total  640  million  letters  are  workshared.  The  welfare 
improvement is € 77 million and the sum of worksharing discount totals € 97 
million. Entry occurs in 5 segments (all business segments but rural fast 
mail). We note that these nice results do not hold anymore if worksharing 
discounts were set above avoided costs. 
It is interesting to observe that the entrant charges a higher price than the 
incumbent does. Parameter analysis with different values for e shows that 
only  for  high  values  of  e  are  the  entrant‟s prices  lower.  I.e.,  only  if  the 
entrant cannot differentiate its products relative to the incumbent‟s ones, it 
must charge a lower price. If the entrant reaches to do product innovation, it 
might benefit from higher prices. In this case, consumers also benefit (their 
needs  are  better  served)  and,  of  course,  so  does  the  incumbent,  who  gets  the 
additional volume for downstream delivery.  
 
Table 5: Results Worksharing and Price Cap Competition 
  U.S. Worksharing  Price Cap Competition 
  e = 0,85  e = 0,75   = 0%   = 3%   = 20% 
Average Price (€)            
Incumbent   0.44    0.44    0.44    0.44    0.43  
Entrant   0.46    0.51    0.35    0.36    0.41  
Average   0.45  0.46  0.41   0.41    0.42  
Quantities (Mio #)           
Incumbent (*upstream)   2'291*    2'307*    2'073    2'079    2'432  
Entrant   640    705    1'016    1'008    538  
Total    2'932    3'012    3'090    3'088    2'970  
Welfare (Mio €)           
Consumer surplus  1'515  1'533  1'612  1'610  1'560 
Profit I after transfer   -22    -1    -300    -287    -165  
Profit Entrant   21    48    90    79    21  
Welfare   1'514    1'580    1'402    1'402    1'416  
Welfare change (RM)   +77    +143    -35    -35    -21  
Welfare change (RC)      +100  +108  +51 
Other      
Discounts/Fees (Mio €)   97   118   0  10  44 
Entry in # segments  5   7   3  3  2 
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Table  5  presents  detailed  model  results  and  illustrates  the  positive 
welfare and profit effects of a further increase in product differentiation.  
The  model  supports  the  experience  from  the  U.S.:  Successful  entry 
occurs in business segments, the USP gains and can better sustain the USO 
at  low  prices.  There  is  only  one  group,  which  is  worse  off,  namely  the 
workforce who represents the avoided upstream variable costs. However, 
they lose much less than in the case of regulated competition.  
5.3. Price Cap Competition 
The two end-to-end competition cases from section 4 yield much lower 
overall welfare than worksharing. One reason is the price-driving effect of 
the licensing system. To offset this price-driving effect, we supplement the 
RC case with a price freeze. 
Table 5 reports the results of such a “Price Cap Competition.” The price 
freeze has a positive effect on overall welfare compared to the Regulated 
Competition case (but not compared with the Regulated Monopoly) because 
the overall price level drops. The incumbent is worse off. He has no further 
possibility of responding competitively and its deficit increases up to € 287 
million – the USO burden is not covered at all. Once again, this regulatory 
regime is not feasible for Switzerland from a legal point of view. Similar to 
the findings in section 4, only a sufficient high licensing rate can stabilize 
the financial situation of the USP. It prevents entry, and if the rate is set 
accordingly, it gives the incumbent incentives to reduce costs and to avoid 
potential entry.  
5.4. Discussion 
Both the regulatory regimes presented in this section did help to improve 
overall welfare compared to the competition cases examined in section 4. 
However,  Price  Cap  Competition  is  desirable  for  consumers  (higher  net 
utility), but not for the ones who must pay the higher burden of the universal 
service obligation. If this burden would have to be paid by the consumers 
through  a  special  postal  tax,  they  are  again  worse  off  compared  to  the 
Regulated Monopoly of Swiss Post in 2003.  
In contrast, Worksharing seems to be the only system that can improve 
economic  efficiency  in  the  sector.  Worksharing  realizes  the  benefits  of 
competition  without  sacrificing  the  economies  of  scale  in  delivery  and 
putting universal service at risk. 
Empirically, one could try to find out how tariffs and volumes do vary 
between  the  different  regulatory  regimes  applied  in  practice  today.  The 
model predicts that the United States should have large volumes per capita 
ceteris paribus. In liberalized markets, postal operators should have problems 
sustaining the USO due to smaller volumes. In regulated monopolies (or 
licensing  regimes  with  very  high  rates)  tariffs  and  volumes  should  lie Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 18 
 
 
somewhere in between. However, such a comparison is difficult, because 
demand and supply factors vary heavily across nations.  
 
6.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
Like the member states of the European Community, Switzerland is in 
the process of liberalizing its domestic postal markets. In 2004, a new postal 
ordinance  fully  opened  the  parcels  market  by  introducing  end-to-end 
competition using a licensing system to help the incumbent fund its universal 
service obligation.  
We asked, what would happen if the letter market were liberalized in the 
same  way?  To  gain  deeper  insight  on  this  issue,  we  adapted  a  price 
competition framework from De Donder et al. (2001), tailored it to Swiss 
circumstances and extended it further to include worksharing. The model 
enables  quantitative  comparisons  between  monopoly,  competition  and 
worksharing scenarios. Despite the limits of such a quantitative model, we 
believe that the main results are robust and straightforward. 
We identify U.S. Worksharing
10 as a Pareto improvement  compared to 
monopoly regulation.  Moreover,  our model  predicts  higher  welfare and 
much better USP stability than various ways of end-to-end competition with 
different  levels  of  licensing  rates.  End -to-end  competition  with its  full 
liberalization of the postal value chain  is leading to serious difficulties for 
the incumbent  to sustain  the Universal Service   requirements. The more 
restrictions  are  imposed  on  the  incumbent‟s  pricing  flexibility  (uniform 
price,  price  freeze),  the  worse  becomes  the  financial  situation  of  the 
incumbent.  
We conclude that Switzerland should be very cautious when copying 
European plans of end-to-end competition. We believe caution is especially 
indicated when the assumption of high economies of scale in delivery truly 
reflects  the  industry.  Our  model  predicts  that  complete  letter  market 
liberalization will lead to higher prices, to much more price differentiation 
between regions and customers (in favor of business customers and cities), 
to an erosion of Universal Service due to Swiss Post‟s attempts to adapt its 
business model to the underlying market forces and to continuous financial 
problems of the incumbent. Some of these problems could be mitigated by 
combining  liberalization  with  a  mandatory  access  regime  under  which 
competitors  could  use  the  incumbent‟s  delivery  network  when  needed. 
However, the financial consequences to the USP will remain serious because 
                                                 
10 The Pareto improvement is only achieved if retail prices stay regulated and 
worksharing discounts are equal or less to avoided costs.  Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss letter market  page 19 
 
 
the entrant‟s competitive advantage gets even larger. We leave an evaluation 
within our model for further research. 
The model cannot cope with some dynamic advantages of competition. 
For  example,  there  were  no  possibilities  for  Swiss  Post  for  dynamic 
efficiency gains over time. If one believes those efficiency potentials to be 
large, end-to-end competition could still be a desirable solution. However, 
postal services already face increasing indirect competition through digital 
means of written communication. The overall volume in single-piece mail is 
shrinking in most highly developed countries, including Switzerland despite 
growing  written  communication  markets.  This  rapidly  evolving  “e-
competition” threatens the postal services as end-to-end competition does. 
Regulated  “monopolists”  and  worksharers  are  “hit”  only  once,  whereas 
incumbents competing in fully liberalized letter markets are “hit” twice.  
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